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The domestic auto industry is in the worst financial crisis in its history.  To date, Ford Motor Company 
has managed to avoid the conditions that forced Chrysler Group LLC and General Motors Corporation to 
accept government scrutiny in exchange for bailout loans.  However, now that Chrysler has entered 
bankruptcy the impact on the supply base that supports all three companies is mounting and the 
probability of a negative impact on Ford is rising.  Thus, the crisis affects the entire industry, with the 
Detroit 3 hit hardest. 
If any doubters remained, the crisis has clearly revealed that the business model of the Detroit 3 
automakers is broken. Analysts may disagree about how much and how quickly the model needs to 
change, but all are in agreement that it must change. 
The forces responsible for this crisis did not appear suddenly to blindside the industry in 2008.  They have 
been building for years.  In research begun in 2005, we identified and examined a series of misalignments 
between the market and Detroit’s product portfolio, especially with respect to fuel economy.  There is 
broad consensus between both industry and non-industry stakeholders that improving the fuel economy of 
the product portfolio is necessary to achieve widely accepted public policy goals (reduced dependence on 
oil, energy independence, and greenhouse gas reductions).  However, some in the industry and the 
government believe that in the current crisis the fuel economy target and/or the speed with which the 
industry makes progress toward it should be lessened. 
The domestic auto industry is faced with a set of choices: how much should it change, how fast should it 
change, and how should it respond to demands for increased fuel efficiency?  The purpose of this paper is 
to help resolve this debate.  
Given recent government intervention, the impact of these decisions reach far beyond the industry.  Every 
American taxpayer now holds a stake in the success of our domestic auto industry.  
To provide objective information to help policy makers understand the issues involved, we conducted 
research on two themes that we report here.  One theme looks at change in a crisis, and the other looks at 
the impacts of mandated fuel economy improvements on the industry.  What links the themes is the 
product portfolio.  
The long-term success of a turnaround depends on executing an excellent portfolio of products, and the 
impact of mandated fuel economy improvements depends on the alignment of the industry’s product 
portfolio with consumer values.  The questions concerning speed and scope of change and the impact of 
fuel economy on profitability address the core drivers of long-term viability of the Detroit 3.  
Methodology 
 To address the questions of speed and scope of change, we looked at the actions of other large 
corporations that have managed successful turnarounds.  There is extensive literature on this subject, both 
academic studies and interviews with corporate leaders.  In order to address the question of fuel economy 
standards, we model the impacts of different fuel economy standard increases (30%-35 miles per gallon 
(MPG), 40%-37.7 MPG, 50%-40.4 MPG) on the profitability and sales of the industry and separately for 
the Detroit 3, the Japan 3, and all others.  The model captures the cost of fuel economy improvement on 
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suppliers, its impact on pricing, and the resulting changes in demand.  The inputs to the model are the 
most recent and accepted estimates of all the key parameters, but since there is debate on many of these 
values, we conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis on the results. 
Findings  
The lessons from successful turnarounds are very clear: 
• Implement Broad, Deep, Fast Change:  All successful efforts addressed the fundamental 
issues that drove them into crisis and they did it as quickly as possible.  
• Replace Management Team:  In addition to changes in strategy and structure, in all cases 
there were widespread changes in management.  
• Transform Culture:  All of the successful companies considered changing culture a critical 
requirement and made it a top priority for success.  
• Build a portfolio of excellent products:  The path to long-term financial health for any 
company rests on having a great product portfolio.  Our domestic auto industry, in its modern 
incarnation, has never been able to execute an excellent portfolio, only isolated successes. 
The impact of higher fuel economy standards on industry profits is also very clear: 
• An industry-wide mandated increase in fuel economy of 30% to 50% (35 MPG to 40.5 
MPG) would increase the Detroit 3’s gross profits by roughly $3 billion per year, and 
increase sales by the equivalent of two large assembly plants. 
• The Detroit 3 gain profits over base in all scenarios, with the largest profits gained from 
pursuing more aggressive fuel economy. 
• Japanese automakers profit gains are smaller than the Detroit 3, with the smallest profits 
gained from pursuing 50% increase (40.4 MPG) in fuel economy. 
• At 50% increase, the Japanese industry loses sales while the domestics continue to gain 
in sales and profitability, a result driven by the different starting points.  
Profits 
 Base   30% (35  MPG) 40% (37.7 MPG) 50%(40.4 MPG) 
Detroit 3 $39.5  $2.9  $3.2  $3.1  
Japan 3 $27.1  $0.9  $0.7  $0.3  
Others $18.8  $0.9  $1.0  $1.2  
Market Total $85.4  $4.7  $4.9  $4.6  
 
Vehicle Sales (000) 
Scenario O/(U) Base 
Base   30% (35  MPG) 40% (37.7   MPG) 50% (40.4 MPG)  
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Detroit 3 7,276  527  521  446  
Japan 3 5,282  72  (27) (171) 
Others 2,646  145  147  133  
Market Total 15,204  744  641  408  
 
The value given to fuel economy by automakers has critical impact moving forward: 
• There is compelling evidence that the Detroit 3 have systematically underestimated the 
value of fuel economy to customers. 
• Because Detroit 3 automakers have long underestimated the consumer value of fuel 
economy, raising fuel economy standards will not cost more than consumers would be 
willing to pay. 
• In every scenario, the average cost-per-vehicle (direct plus indirect) is less than what 




Consumer Value of Fuel Economy 




Direct + Indirect Cost 
per Vehicle 
Consumer Value of 
Fuel Saved 
Value - Cost 
30% $1,679  $2,180  $501  
40% $2,296  $2,697  $400  
50% $2,935  $3,136  $201  
    




Direct + Indirect Cost 
per Vehicle 
Consumer Value of 
Fuel Saved 
Value - Cost 
30% $1,752  $2,994  $1,242  
40% $2,410  $3,701  $1,290  
50% $3,111  $4,319  $1,208  
    
    




Direct + Indirect Cost 
per Vehicle 
Consumer Value of 
Fuel Saved 
Value - Cost 
30% $1,715  $2,578  $863  
40% $2,352  $3,187  $835  
50% $3,021  $3,714  $693  
Testing Our Assumptions: Sensitivity Analysis 
Recognizing that our findings challenge long-held domestic industry beliefs about fuel economy and will 
be met with great skepticism and scrutiny, we conducted a sensitivity analysis of our eleven assumptions, 
such as the price of fuel and consumer value of fuel economy.  
Our finding that Detroit 3 automakers’ profits would increase under higher fuel economy standards is 
very robust.  We assessed the sensitivity of our prediction of Detroit 3 automakers’ profits to extreme 
values of 11 uncertain factors we predict for our model, and found that just three of the factors had 
extreme values capable of generating a drop in Detroit 3 profits:  an extremely low consumer response to 
fuel costs relative to vehicle prices (less than one-fourth Sawhill’s (2008) statistically estimated median 
value), a gasoline price of $1.50 per gallon (an extremely low price not seen since 1999), or direct 
manufacturing costs (materials and labor) that are 2.2 times the estimates we used (Meszler) and 3 to 4 
times the National Research Council (2002) estimates (adjusted for inflation).  While the three factors 
could result in losses rather than gains in profits, the likelihood of lost profits is low.  There is a 7% 
chance that profits would be less than zero if CAFE were increased 30% (35 MPG), a 15% chance of a 
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loss if it were 50% (40.4 MPG).  As intuition would suggest, the larger mandate increases the downside 
risk.  But it also offers greater upside opportunity, as the chance that increased profits could exceed $6 
billion is 18% for a 50% increase in fuel economy, but only 6% for a 30% increase.  The total uncertainty 
attached to the larger increase is greater, which means both more upside and more downside.  
Overall, the risk and reward profile of these scenarios is very positive, with only a small chance of losing 
and a very large probability of gain.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  30% (35MPG) 40% (37.7MPG) 50% (40.4 MPG) 
Probability 
Change Profit <$0 




 18% 13% 6% 
Conclusion 
A broad consensus has emerged in the current crisis that the Detroit 3 automakers need to be transformed. 
The business model they have followed since the 1970’s is clearly broken.  While the need for 
transformation is widely accepted, there is still disagreement about the scope and pace of change, and 
some voices in the industry and in government are suggesting that fuel economy and greenhouse gas 
regulations should be lowered or delayed.  
We studied two general themes in the research reported here: the nature of change in a crisis and its 
impact on the way transformations should be done, and the impact of higher fuel economy regulations on 
costs, consumer demand for vehicles, and automakers’ profits.  Our findings support rapid, wide-reaching 
change in business models. The key to a long-term recovery is executing an excellent portfolio of 
products, and we find evidence that increasing fuel economy standards encourages automakers to create a 




Chapter One: Change in Crisis 
There are those who believe that because the domestic auto industry is in crisis, it is the wrong time to 
make anything other than the immediate changes necessary for today’s survival.  On the other hand, there 
have been widespread calls for broad changes that address the core issues that led to the current troubles 
and that these changes should be executed as quickly as possible. 
This sections addresses four major questions: 
• Should changes be broad or focused on immediate issues? 
• Should change be as fast as possible or spread out? 
• Should existing management be replaced? 
• Is changing culture important in a turnaround? 
These questions are broadly important to US policy because the taxpayer is funding the bailout, so it is of 
vital national interest that it succeeds.  If the industry is compelled to move quickly and broadly when 
caution and focus is in order, then success is imperiled.  But just as dangerous is a turnaround that fails to 
address the core issues and only defers the day of reckoning, making it ultimately more expensive. 
ANALYSIS OF SUCCESSFUL TURNAROUND EFFORTS  
 
In order to address these questions, we analyzed extensive literature on the successful turnaround of six 
international companies of comparable size, distress, and diversity to the domestic automobile industry.  
There is an abundance of academic research on these cases as well as multiple interviews with the people 
who led the efforts (sources are in the back).  One of the world’s most successful turnaround experts, 
David James, has also commented on many of these issues. 
There is a surprising degree of agreement from all these sources on these questions and lessons learned 
about change, personnel, culture and product portfolio.  The research revealed universal approaches 
critical to success.   
 
SUCCESSFUL TURNAROUND: KEY LESSONS LEARNED 
I.  Implement Broad, Deep, Fast Change  
There is overwhelming agreement that change should take place as fast as possible and be as 
comprehensive as possible.  A crisis presents a unique opportunity to make changes that would not be 
possible in “better” times and urgency is a must for the successful renewal of a company on the brink. 
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Further, the root causes of the crisis lie in deeper issues of structure and strategy, so if they are not 
changed the company will do too little, too late and not deal with real problems.   
“The rallying cry of our turnaround was do it fast, do it right away, do it all at once, do it now!” –
Continental 
“Make mega changes” and “Move expeditiously.” -Lockheed Martin 
“We had ...a ’kitchen sink’ quarter, when you clean up the mess.”–Novell 
“When you have that window of opportunity called a crisis, move as quickly as you can, get as much 
done as you can.” -Xerox  
“Fixing IBM required an enormous sense of urgency. “  “We changed almost everything in this 
company, literally, in three months, eight months, a couple of years.” -IBM  
“Many executives misdirect their efforts...they put all their energy into managing the company’s cash 
flow when they should be addressing corporate structure and strategy...because they find it hard to 
rethink the structures and strategies they themselves put in place. Whatever the reason, the consequences 
are usually the same. The rescue starts too late and accomplishes less than it should.” –David James 
“A degenerative disease will not be cured by procrastination. It requires decisive action.” –Peter 
Drucker  
 
II. Replace Existing Management Team  
There is strong consensus that widespread changes in personnel are necessary in a turnaround.  For most, 
the issue was changing the people at the top of the organization, while IBM had a big problem with 
middle management.  But the dominant thinking is that the most serious problems are the result of poor 
management, not external bad luck, so asking the people who made the mess to genuinely admit it was 
their fault and reverse course will not happen.  Instead, the existing management clings to the hope that 
some miracle will rescue them and avoid the difficult decisions.  
When Sergio Marchionne took over Fiat, he made significant changes in its management team, going 
down several levels as did Carlos Gohn at Nissan and Renault.  Just recently, Toyota, which has had its 
first loss in many years but is not imperiled, announced it would replace 40% of its management, 
including the top three executives. 
“Clean House.  The same team that leads a company into crisis is rarely able to get it back on track.” –
Continental 
“We ...replaced most of the executive management team, reducing seven layers of management to 
four.” –Novell 
“If necessary, sweep out the old leaders...Unfortunately in many cases I have had to fire them because 
they...maintain their hope for some miracle solution and resist the rescuers in an effort to conceal their 
failure.” – David James 
“At the top of the organization was a leadership team that really wanted to speed things up. The customer 
facing parts of the organization felt that that the changes were the right thing to do.  But there was a 
group of people in the middle that didn’t want to have anything to do with it.  They just wanted it to 




III. Transform Culture  
One of the consistent themes in the literature is the importance of culture to a successful turnaround.  
Everyone said that culture was a main contributor to the problem and needed to be addressed directly and 
quickly. Anne Mulcahy, Xerox CEO,  made it clear she thought the culture was a problem but that rather 
than “kill it”, she would change it.  Recent correspondence with GM’s CEO indicates he believes 
changing culture is critical to GM’s long-term viability and has made it a priority in his turnaround plans.  
“Establish a results oriented culture...Build a new corporate culture. A healthy culture is 
simply...honesty, trust, dignity, and respect” –Continental 
“Novell had a dysfunctional culture, a sick culture...a culture of fear...and it was a big problem.” –
Novell 
“In addition to cost cutting, innovation, and growth...the fourth requirement for transformation is 
culture change.” – Siemens 
“It’s all about culture. You have to transform the culture, not just the strategy. Culture is what people do 
when no one is watching...Culture isn't just one aspect of the game; it is the game.” –IBM  
When the CEO of one of Mulcahy's biggest lenders said she would have to kill the culture to succeed, 
Mulcahy shot back, "I am the culture.  If I can't figure out how to bring the culture with me, I'm the 
wrong person for the job."  She appealed to employees with missionary zeal, in videos and in person-- 
what Burns called a "laying on of hands."  She implored them to "save each dollar as if it were your own. 
-Xerox 
 
IV. Implement a Clear and Well-Communicated Strategy  
It is important to have a clear and well-communicated strategy.  All the CEOs talked about the need to 
work hard to communicate the plan to all levels of the organization in a clear and consistent way and, 
while listening to feedback, to be firm on what needed to be done.  Successfully implementing the 
changes required aligning the organization at all levels.  Since all turnaround plans required deep changes 
in the operations of the enterprise, the people on the front lines had to understand what they needed to do 
and why they needed to do it.  
V. Institutionalize Accountability  
Another theme was the importance of identifying failure quickly and eliminating it.  There is a tendency 
to hold on to existing people, plans, and businesses even after repeated failures.  This simply removes 
accountability and perpetuates problems.  
VI.  Focus on value, not costs 
To execute a successful turnaround, management must understand how their actions change the total 
value of their products, not just the costs.  This means having an understanding of how their customers 
view their products; what it is the customers want and are willing to pay for.  A culture of cost cutting, 
unfortunately, leads to the development of products that people do not like, as product decisions are made 
on a basis that is always incomplete and usually disastrous.  
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“After 15 years of a low cost approach, Continental had created a doom loop. By focusing only on costs, 
the airline had created a product no one wanted to buy.” -Continental 
The culture of cost cutting at the Domestic 3, especially GM, has been well documented.  While the 
forward capital plan has not been published, press reports have stated that capital and engineering 
resources for the next generation of products have been cut fairly drastically.  If so, then there is reason to 
be concerned about their market success and the long-term health of the companies.  
VII. Understand the balance sheet 
Turning around a major enterprise requires understanding what the real assets and liabilities are.  Simply 
trying to increase cash flow will be too slow and do too little to make a significant difference.  The 
company is usually hemorrhaging cash so changing product or pricing will require too much time to save 
the enterprise.  In the context of the auto companies, this means understanding which regions, brands, and 
products are generating real value and which are not and then removing the former ruthlessly.  
Bottom line: Execute Excellent Portfolio of Products 
The path to long-term financial health of any company is not a great mystery; it rests on having a great 
product portfolio.  Our domestic auto industry, in its modern incarnation, has never been able to execute 
an excellent portfolio, only isolated successes.  The fundamental cause has been insufficient capital and 
engineering, driven by a culture focused on cost cutting, myopic to value and tone deaf to customers.  The 
management team is fundamental to the culture.  They lead and sustain it. Their worldview, their values, 
and their plans have made these companies what they are today.  One would hope that human beings are 
capable of radical change in values and vision but human experience proves otherwise.  Instead, it is 
human nature, especially when joined by others, to defend one's position, in the hope that one day you 
will be proven right.  The result: every decision will be challenged; every change watered down.  The 
problem is they don't have time to waste.  
 
As the Detroit 3 automakers are poised on the brink of turnaround or demise, they must make a choice of 
how far, how fast, and how fuel-efficient the transformation of their product portfolio will be.  This is not 
their decision alone to make.  Given the highly interdependent nature of the domestic automobile 
industry, the taxpayer has substantial vested interest in the choices made by not just GM but all domestic 
automakers.   
At this moment in history, there is a widespread consensus in Detroit, both within the industry and the 
media, that the industry is being forced to build more fuel-efficient vehicles by a government that places 
more importance on ideology than the market.  Story after story frames the issue of a struggling industry 
that will not survive tough fuel economy standards.  However, there is substantial evidence that the 
domestic auto industry has ignored customers’ demands for fuel economy, and has consistently 
undervalued the impact of fuel economy on their profit potential.  For example, GM conducted internal 
research for decades that found customers value fuel economy far more than the company’s financial 
calculations assumed.  As publicly reported, the company systematically discounted these research results 
when calculating the benefits of improving fuel economy, often by as much as two-thirds.  In other 
words, if the research said the sales gain would be 10%, the number used to do financial calculations was 
3%.  In fact, the belief that fuel economy was not "worth it" became so ingrained into the culture of the 
company, and so institutionalized in decision making that the senior people might not even be aware that 
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they have been ignoring their own research.   
 
The previous section provided detailed documentation on the need for transformation to be far and fast if 





Chapter Two: Profit impact of higher fuel economy standards 
Regulatory standards exert substantial influence on product portfolios and the attributes of products, and 
both Federal and state standards for greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and fuel economy were in the 
process of tightening before the current industry crisis.  Congress established an industrywide 35 MPG 
Federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard (CAFE) to be attained by the year 2020, and 
California’s Air Resources Board (CARB) set a GHG standard that by 2016 is roughly equivalent to 
35MPG.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is expected to issue Federal GHG rules in 
the near future.  However, the current crisis has prompted some in the industry and others to argue for 
reducing or at least slowing the implementation of standards until the crisis is over. 
The “just not in a crisis” argument for reducing or delaying future fuel economy and GHG emissions 
standards is based on the claim that the costs of improving vehicles exceed what consumers are willing to 
pay for the improvements.  This claim is not different because of the crisis, and has always been a 
standard element of the industry’s criticism of higher standards.  Such investments are certain losers, 
asserts the industry, and we support the social goals of the investments and are committed to make them 
someday, just not in a crisis.  
This argument depends on some unproven propositions.  If the unproven propositions are not true, then 
the “just not in a crisis” argument fails.  The unproven propositions are (1) that automakers know the 
value that consumers place on attributes of vehicles, (2) that automakers know the cost of changing 
attributes, and (3) that the vehicles that exist in the vehicle market are optimal in all attributes. 
Our analysis of the impact of fuel economy standards on profitability raises doubts about all three 
propositions on which the “just not in a crisis” argument depends. The “just not in a crisis” conclusion is, 
“lowering or slowing the implementation of higher standards would give relief (higher profit) to the 
Detroit 3.” Our analysis tests this conclusion and raises the stakes by addressing the question, “Would 
tightening the standards and/or speeding their implementation result in higher or lower profits for the 
Detroit 3?” 
We estimated the impacts of higher fuel economy standards relative to a baseline forecast of sales, 
revenue, and costs for 2016. The baseline forecast used 2008 fuel economy levels (average MPG 26.9), 
and incorporated anticipated changes in products offered and sales by manufacturer and segment.  We 
examined three scenarios for higher industrywide fuel economy standards defined by percentage increases 
in baseline fuel economy: 30% (35 MPG approximately CAFE 2020 or Pavley 2016); 40% (37.7 MPG); 
and 50% (40.4 MPG).  Consumer demand and manufacturer cost models were used to estimate for each 
scenario the impacts on sales and profits relative to the baseline.  We then conducted an extensive 




Baseline: Middle Range Industry Forecast 2016 
Middle Range Industry Forecast, 2016 
 Thousands of Units Sold 
Type of Vehicle Detroit 3 Japan 3 Industry 
Passenger Car 2,660  3,374  7,773  
Crossover Utility 1,370  1,101  2,868  
Minivan & Large Van 581  232  859  
Pickup 1,772  368  2,140  
Sport Utility 892  207  1,565  
Industry 7,276  5,282  15,204  
Source: The Planning Edge, April 2009  
See Citi Investment Research (2009), CAFE Panel Conference Call & Briefing, April. 
Type of Vehicle Chrysler Ford GM Honda Nissan Toyota Others Industry 
Passenger Car 418  828  1,415  1,065  664  1,645  1,738  7,773  
Crossover Utility 174  574  622  345  235  520  396  2,868  
Minivan & Large Van 307  140  135  127  0  106  45  859  
Pickup 440  612  719  21  96  251  0  2,140  
Sport Utility 253  185  454  0  94  113  466  1,565  
Total 1,592  2,339  3,345  1,559  1,089  2,634  2,646  15,204  
Source: The Planning Edge, April 2009       
See Citi Investment Research (2009), CAFE Panel Conference Call & Briefing, April. 
Sales by automaker and segment for our baseline scenario were provided by The Planning Edge.  All the 
changes we consider in this report were with respect to this baseline.  The scenario represents The 
Planning Edge’s mid-range outlook for the U.S. market in the near future.  
We defined cost and demand for the automaker by segment level.  In the analysis, a market entry (the 
lowest level we modeled) is defined as an aggregate of an automaker’s products in a segment.  For 
example, GM has several Luxury Car products that we aggregated into a composite “GM Luxury Car” 
market entry.  The attributes of the GM Luxury Car market entry are the sales-weighted averages of the 
products that comprise the market entry (fuel economy is the sales-weighted harmonic average). 
The aggregation to automaker by segment market entries is consistent with our market demand and 
automaker cost information.  We are using a price-elasticity demand model that is defined at the 
automaker by segment level.  The own and cross-price elasticities were originally derived from a segment 
level elasticity model from General Motors.  We estimated the automaker by segment elasticities using a 
method developed by the Congressional Budget Office.  The costs of improving fuel economy, which 
were provided by Meszler Engineering Services (See CITI Investment Research (2009) for details), are 






Consumer demand is modeled as a set of 75 demand equations -- one for each market entry. There are 7 
automakers: the Detroit 3, the Japan 3, and an aggregate of all others. With the 15 segments in our model, 
there are 105 (=15X7) possible market entries, but since an automaker may not offer products in all 
segments there are 75 actual market entries. 
The quantity of entry m demanded by consumers is a function of the “effective consumer prices” of all 75 
market entries. (The elasticity matrix is 75 X 75.)  The effective consumer price for an entry n is the retail 
price of that entry plus the adjusted expected future fuel costs for that entry.  The adjustment in expected 
fuel costs consists is multiplied by φ , a measure of the relative consumer response to fuel cost (an 
operating cost) vs. retail price (a capital cost). 
We estimate the expected fuel costs as the discounted present value over the life of the vehicle of the 
annual future expected fuel costs of operating the vehicle.  Along with the fuel economy of entry n, 
several consumer preference factors determine expected fuel costs.  Vehicle Lifetime is the consumer 
time horizon for the present value calculation.  First Year Fuel Price and First Year Miles Driven establish 
the level of annual fuel costs. 
The future fuel costs are brought into present value by applying the Overall Discount Rate, which is 
defined by consumer behavior and expectations about the Expected Fuel Price Growth, the Rate of 
Change in Miles per Year, and the (real) Consumer Discount Rate.  Expected annual vehicle miles 
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generally fall as a vehicle ages based on two considerations.  Not all vehicles survive from one year to the 
next, and a declining fraction of vehicles of a given vintage remain in use as they age.  There is also 
evidence from the National Household Travel Survey that older vehicles are driven fewer miles. 
Direct and Indirect Costs of Improving Fuel Economy 
We estimated the direct and indirect costs of improving fuel economy at the “enterprise” level—
combining the change in costs at the automaker and its dealerships. 
Automakers’ Direct and Indirect Costs 
 
We developed a model of product cost to estimate the impact of improving vehicle fuel economy on 
OEM and Dealership cost and retail price.  Our estimates of the impact of a given industrywide 
percentage increase in fuel economy on product cost and profit assume that each market entry is improved 
by the same percentage.  This significantly eases the model’s computational burden, and does not 
materially influence our directional findings.  Our analysis focuses on the impact of alternative scenarios 
on the (gross) profits of the Detroit 3.  If they can meet an industrywide increase in fuel economy by 
applying different rates of improvement by segment, then they would be able to increase profits (reduce 




The OEM Product Cost model distinguishes between Direct and Indirect Costs.  The estimates of the 
Direct Cost of improving fuel economy were developed by Meszler Engineering Services and are 
contained in CITI Investment Research (2009). Direct cost = Direct Labor + Direct Materials.  We 
assume that an improvement in fuel economy also increases some Indirect Cost items including, Warranty 
& Freight, and Factory Overhead (mainly Engineering in Indirect Labor and Depreciation, Maintenance, 
and Other).  We measure the Indirect cost increase by multiplying Direct cost by an Indirect Cost Ratio 
(assumed to be identical for all automakers).  
The Dealerships’ Direct and Indirect Costs 
 
 
The Dealership New Vehicle Cost model also distinguishes between Direct and Indirect Costs.  From the 
vertical perspective of the enterprise (the OEM and its dealerships), dealership costs are all indirect.  We 
incorporate dealership costs that change when technologies are used to improve fuel economy into our 
measure of Enterprise Indirect Cost.  These may include Direct Cost Dealership-Installed Options, 
Dealership Overhead, and Other Indirect Cost. 
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Enterprise Cost Model 
We combine each automaker and its dealerships for an enterprise view of costs, sales, revenue, and 
profits.  An industrywide increase in fuel economy increases the cost per vehicle.  Direct Costs changes 
include OEM direct labor and materials costs of new components that raise the cost of manufacturing.  
Indirect Cost changes include other changes in OEM costs that vary with output (warranty and freight, if 
affected by new technologies); and some OEM costs that do not vary with production, but cover the costs 
of changing the vehicle or the manufacturing process (OEM engineering expense and OEM factory 
overhead).  Indirect costs also include dealership costs that are changed to deal with selling and servicing 
new technologies. 
Vertical View of Enterprise (Automaker and Its Dealerships)  
Change in Cost = (1 + Indirect Cost Multiplier) X (change in Direct Cost) 
Change in Price = (1 + ICM + Gross Profit Rate) X (change in Direct Cost) 
Consumers  
Change in Full Price = Change in Price + φ(change in Fuel Cost)  
An industrywide increase in vehicle fuel economy has impacts on OEMs’ 
and dealerships’ product costs, on product prices, and on consumers‘ 
















The prices and full prices of all market entries are changed by the industry-wide improvement in fuel 
economy. The impact on sales on vehicles by automaker and segment is predicted by applying the 
elasticity matrix to the changes in full prices. 
  Change in Gross Profit = Change in Revenue - Change in Variable Cost 
 
We estimated the increase in the per -vehicle Direct 
Costs resulting from raising fuel economy using cost 
curves. The curves differ by segment, as seen in the 
examples.
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0% 50% 100% 150%
MPG Improvement (%)
Source: Meszler Engineering Services, April, 2009
Our estimates of the impact on Direct Cost of a percentage increase in fuel economy were computed 
using information provided by Meszler Engineering Services (see CITI Investment  Research (2009) for 
details).  We defined cost curves for each segment that predict the change in Direct Cost as a quadratic 
function of the percentage change in fuel economy. 
ΔDC = A( ΔE/E ) + B( ( ΔE/E )^2 ) 
In the sensitivity analysis, we treat uncertainty in the change in cost through an uncertain multiplicative 
factor that scales the change in direct costs to be higher or lower than the prediction from the curves. 
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Automaker Knowledge of Consumer Willingness to Pay 
 
 
A standard assumption of neoclassical economic theory is that automakers have complete knowledge of 
the market -- they know the preferences of their customers for all vehicle attributes, including fuel 
economy, and automakers make and sell vehicles that meet these consumer preferences exactly.  It 
necessarily follows that any improvement in fuel economy would cost more to supply (areas B + C + D) 
than it would be valued by consumers (area D). 
However, there is compelling evidence that automakers (especially the Detroit 3) systematically 
underestimate the value of fuel economy to consumers. 
• References to poor selection (“I can’t find the vehicle I want with the fuel economy I need.”) by 
consumers who stated that it was a bad time to buy a new vehicle increased during the 1970s, 
peaked in 1980, and did not return to pre-oil shock levels until 2002.  References started rising 




• In recent years, as the real price of gasoline increased the unit sales of fuel-inefficient SUVs and 
large cars, which ought to have fallen, did not seem to be affected.  Why?  Automakers 
substantially offset the increase in the resulting present value of fuel costs by dropping prices of 
vehicles and dropping prices of fuel-inefficient vehicles the most.  Estimates of the 
responsiveness of vehicle sales to fuel prices that ignore these vehicle price offsets understate 
consumer preferences for fuel economy (McManus 2007; Miller & Langer 2008). 
•  “…they are not making cars and trucks that enough Americans want to buy.  And this has been 
true to some degree since the first energy shock hit the U.S. in the early 1970s.”   (Crandell & 
Winston WSJ 11/27/08) 
• Continuing loss of market by Detroit 3 to competitors with more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
Using the True WTP (assuming consumers respond the same to fuel cost as to retail price) the net gain to 
consumers is the area A.  Automakers can raise prices and increase Gross Profits. 
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Results: Profits and Sales Impacts 
Industry average fuel economy is 26.9 MPGin the baseline mid-level future-market scenario. Gross 
profits are estimated for the automakers and their dealerships combined at $85.3 billion for the industry. 
Vehicle unit sales are 15.204 million, reflecting The Planning Edge’s expectation of a recover from 
current sales that are running below 10 million on an annual basis Services (See Citi Investment Research 
(2009) for details). 
We estimated detailed impacts for three scenarios for industry-wide fuel economy improvements: 
 30% improvement (35.0MPG) 
 40% improvement (37.7 MPG) 
 50% improvement (40.4 MPG) 
We used the EPA’s laboratory composite fuel economy values, unadjusted for CAFE flex-fuel credits, so 
a precise match to CAFE is not expected. 
We estimated the detailed impacts on the industry of three levels of improvement 
in industrywide fuel economy: 30%, 40%, and 50%.  Industry total gross profit 
increases relative to the base case in all three scenarios; Detroit 3 gross profits 
increase roughly $3 billion (8%) relative to the base case in all three scenarios. 
Sales and Gross Profit Impacts 
 Base 30% 40% 50% 
     
Market MPG 26.9 35.0 37.7 40.4 
     
Gross Profits (billions) 
  Scenario O/(U) Base  
 Base 30% 40% 50% 
Detroit 3 $39.5 $2.9 $3.2 $3.1 
Japan 3 $27.1 $0.9 $0.7 $0.3 
Others $18.8 $0.9 $1.0 $1.2 
Market Total $85.4 $4.7 $4.9 $4.6 
     
Vehicle Sales (000) 
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  Scenario O/(U) Base  
 Base 30% 40% 50% 
Detroit 3 7,276 527 521 446 
Japan 3 5,282 72 (27) (171) 
Others 2,646 145 147 133 
Market Total 15,204 744 641 408 
 
The results show that higher fuel economy standards are favorable to the Detroit 3 automakers. Gross 
profits of the Detroit 3 automakers increase relative to the baseline by roughly $3 billion (8%) in all three 
scenarios.  Unit sales of the Detroit 3 automakers increase relative to base by 446,000 to 527,000 (about 
two assembly plants at 80% utilization). 
The results are not as favorable for the Japan 3 automakers.  Gross profits of the Japan 3 automakers 
increase relative to the base case in all scenarios, but the size of the increase appears to fall as fuel 
economy standards increase from 35 MPG to 40.4 MPG.  Part of the explanation for the less favorable 
outcomes for the Japan 3 automakers can be traced to changes in unit sales.  The Japan 3 automakers’ unit 
sales increase if industrywide fuel economy improves 30% (to 35 MPG), but decrease by 27,000 units if 
industrywide fuel economy improves 40% (to 37.7 MPG), and then by 171,000 units if industrywide fuel 






As fuel economy improvement goes from 0% to 80% (and higher), Direct and Indirect Costs rise at an 
increasing rate.  At the same time, from the consumer’s perspective, vehicle purchase price rises while the 
projected fuel costs of operating the vehicle fall.  The consumer’s full price falls if the fuel cost savings 
exceed the price increase, and the full price rises if the fuel cost savings fall short of the price increase. 
The rising and then falling of the change in gross profits are the result of the interaction between 
monotonically rising industry costs and falling and then rising consumer full prices.  Full price falls at 
smaller increases in fuel economy since consumers are willing to pay more for these increases than it 
costs automakers to make them so unit sales increase. At some point, the price increases exceed the fuel 
savings and full prices begin to increase, and unit sales begin to fall.  Eventually the automakers’ gross 
profits also stop rising and start falling. 
27 
 
Japan 3 automakers start with a more fuel-efficient fleet and face the u-turn in gross profits before the 
Detroit 3 do.  Customers of the Japan 3 already get more fuel economy than do customers of the Detroit 
3, so Japan 3 customers value a given percentage increase less than do Detroit 3 customers.  
The point at which the Detroit 3’s profit gains from industrywide improvements peak could occur at 
lower or higher improvements, if some factors are different from our prediction.  For example, if fuel 
prices were higher than the $3 per gallon we forecast, then the turning point would occur at higher 
industrywide fuel economy improvement. 
Robustness of Results to Uncertainty 
A sensitivity analysis was used to understand the robustness of our results. As far as we can ascertain, no 
one has taken a thorough look at the impact of uncertainty over the key inputs on sales and profits.  
People debate what the best single value of a parameter might be but they have such widely different prior 
beliefs that empirical analysis is always unpersuasive.  Rather than add to the noise, we wanted to 
incorporate the full range of opinion into the results and see how the outcome changes.   
The table below lists the factors and the ranges used in the sensitivity analysis.  They can be grouped into 
three categories:  costs and margins, consumer expectations, and consumer preferences.  The range 
encompasses the debate over each of these issues.  As example, to examine the range of debate on the 
costs of improving fuel economy, the Mesler cost curves, we used a multiplier.  The base case is a one, 





Fuel economy cost curves multiplier 2 1 0.5
Indirect cost multiplier 2.2 1.5 1
Profit Margin on new technology 0% 5% 10%
Price of gasoline ($/gallon) $1.50 $3.00 $7.00 
Real rate of change in gasoline price -2.00% 0.00% 5.00%
Rate at which miles driven falls 
(Scrappage)
8.00% 5.20% 2.00%
1st year miles driven (Future miles) 10,000 15,000 18,000
Consumer real discount rate 18.00% 7.00% 2.00%
Relative consumer response to 
operating v capital costs
0.33 1 3
Horizon for valuing expected operating 
cost (years)
10 15 20
Industry Industry size (millions of units) 14.2 15.2 16.3
Sensitivity Analysis: Factors Subject to Uncertainty
Factors









The findings are very similar for all three scenarios.  The 30% case is displayed below as a “tornado” 
chart; the charts for the other two cases are in the appendix.  The range of bar reflects the impact on 
Detroit 3 profits as the uncertainty swings from unfavorable to favorable; the bars are ordered by the size 
of their impact.  There is a vertical line at zero.  If the bar crosses this line, then the impact would be to 
decrease profitability, but if it is on the right, the profits are still positive, even at the unfavorable value. 
 
The robustness of the results is quite striking and sheds light on the debate.  Most of the uncertainties did 
not impact the basic result that increasing mandated fuel economy would increase Detroit 3 profits, but 
three did.  If consumers valued fuel economy at half the value of a “rational man”, gas prices were less 
than $1.50 a gallon, or the costs of improving fuel economy were twice the base case, then a 30% increase 
in CAFE would lower Detroit 3 profits.  But none of the other uncertainties would affect the basic 
conclusion.  The same results hold true for a 40% or 50% increase in fuel economy.  Where you stand on 
these results depends somewhat on your beliefs about these three key parameters, but you would have to 
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The total risk and reward profile is more important to understand the impact of individual factors. The 
total risk is the combination of the individual risk factors in all the possible scenarios with their associated 
likelihood.  To calculate the total impact we assumed that the range between the high and low captured 
80% of the possibilities; in other words, there is a 10% chance the outcome on the factor could be worse 
than the “unfavorable” level and a 10% chance it could be higher than the “favorable”.  The ranges we 
used are broad but do permit outcomes even more extreme.  The table below gives the probability that the 
mandated increase in fuel economy is less than zero and greater than $6 billion; this analyzes the chance 







Probability Change in 
Profit < $0 7% 10% 15% 
Probability Change in 
Profit > $6bn  6% 13% 18% 
 
There is a 7% chance that profits would be less than zero if CAFE were increased 30%, a 15% of a loss if 
it were 50%.  As intuition would suggest, the larger mandate increases the downside risk. But it also 
offers greater upside opportunity, as the chance that the increase profits could exceed $6 billion is 18%, 
but is only 6% for the 30% increase in fuel economy.  The total uncertainty attached to the larger increase 
is greater, which means both more upside and more downside.  
Overall, the risk and reward profile of these scenarios is very positive, with only a small chance of losing 
and a very large probability of gain.  
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Summary of Findings and Discussion 
A broad consensus has emerged in the current crisis that the Detroit 3 automakers need to be transformed.  
The business model they have followed since the 1970’s is clearly broken.  Reliance on gas-guzzling 
SUVs and large cars for domestic profit was risky in several ways.  Cutting prices to offset gradually 
rising gasoline prices from 2000 through 2006 while spending billions to engineer the next generation of 
these vehicles left GM and Chrysler with no margin for error.  There never was a high volume 
international market for SUVs and the large cars the Detroit 3 automakers became dependent upon, so 
when the price of gasoline soared in 2008 and the domestic market for them collapsed, the Detroit 3 
automakers could not avoid the worst of the downside.  Ford was hit as hard as GM and Chrysler, but had 
established expanded credit lines before the credit crunch and has been able to finance its cash-burn 
independent of the government assistance needed by GM and Chrysler. 
While the need for transformation is widely accepted, there is still disagreement about the scope and pace 
of change, and some voices in the industry and in government are suggesting that fuel economy and 
greenhouse gas regulations should be lowered or delayed.  We studied two general themes in the research 
reported here: the nature of change in a crisis and its impact on the way transformations should be done, 
and the impact of higher fuel economy regulations on costs, consumer demand for vehicles, and 
automakers’ profits.  Our findings support rapid, wide-reaching change in business models.  The key to a 
long-term recovery is executing an excellent portfolio of products, and we find evidence that increasing 
fuel economy standards encourages automakers to create a portfolio of products that is more likely to 
raise the profits of the Detroit 3 automakers than to lower them. 
Our research on turnarounds in a crisis found that: 
• Change should be wide-ranging and fast. 
• The existing management team should be replaced. 
• Changing the culture is vital and necessary. 
• The path to long-term success is built on executing an excellent portfolio of products. 
We assessed GM on how well it is making the right changes and whether it is moving fast enough.  Our 
view is that GM is still not prepared to change enough, fast enough to achieve the transformation it needs 
to make. 
Fuel economy standards should not be relaxed in the current crisis.  There is compelling evidence that 
systematically underestimating the value of fuel economy to customers is part of what created the crisis in 
the first place.  There is general agreement that the future portfolio of products needs to be more fuel-
efficient that today’s portfolio.  Change should include improving fuel economy of vehicles. 
Because Detroit 3 automakers have long underestimated the consumer value of fuel economy, raising fuel 
economy standards would not cost more than consumers would be willing to pay.  We found that an 
industrywide mandated increase in fuel economy of 30% to 50% would increase Detroit’s gross profits by 
roughly $3 billion per year, and reduce increase sales by the equivalent of two large assembly plants. 
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The sensitivity analysis of the impacts on profits showed that only a few factors could reverse our finding 
that profits of the Detroit 3 automakers would increase under higher fuel economy standards: relative 
value consumers put on fuel costs compared to vehicle price, the future price of fuel, and the level of 
direct costs to improve fuel economy.  While the three factors could result in losses rather than gains in 
profits, the potential losses are relatively small, and all three factors have much more upside than 
downside.  The total risk and reward profile of these scenarios is very positive, with only a small chance 
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